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The ethnic ‘other’ in Ukrainian history
textbooks: the case of Russia and the
Russians
Jan Germen Janmaat*
Institute of Education, London, UK and Free University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
This paper examines portrayals of Russia and the Russians in two generations of Ukrainian history
textbooks. It observes that the textbooks are highly condemning of Ukraine’s main ethnic other in
the guise of foreign ruler: the tsarist authorities and the Soviet regime are always attributed dubious
and malicious intentions even if there is appreciation for some of their policies. By contrast, the
books, certainly those of the second generation, refrain from presenting highly biased accounts of
the ethnic other as a national group (i.e. Russians). Instances where negative judgements do fall
onto Russians are counterbalanced by excerpts criticizing ethnic Ukrainians or highlighting
conflicting interests within the Ukrainian ethnic group. The negative appraisal of the ethnic other
as foreign ruler is clearly instrumental for the nation-building project as it sustains a discourse
legitimating the existence of Ukraine as independent state. However, recent trends in history
education, the paper concludes, suggest that the importance of nurturing patriotism as a national
policy objective is diminishing.
Keywords: Civic and ethnic conceptions of nationhood; Education; Ethnic stereotypes; Textbook analysis;
Ukraine
Introduction
National consolidation is usually one of the top priorities of new states and education
is often seen as the key agent in this process. By educating youngsters in the national
language, history and culture, the political elites of these states hope to strengthen
national unity and patriotism and abate internal divisions of an ethnic or social
nature. Nation building policies like these have been well documented for both
western and eastern states both now and in the past. Many studies have pointed to
the problematic nature of these policies in multi-ethnic societies by noting that the
promotion of one language and culture automatically leads to the demotion of
another (e.g. Linz & Stepan, 1996; Kymlicka, 2001). In this sense, as one observer
has perceptively noted, nation building also entails ‘nation destroying’ (Connor,
1972). There is a wealth of literature, particularly in relation to the post-communist
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states, highlighting the tensions that arise between the ethnic majority on the one
hand and one or several minorities on the other when the latter resist the cultural
unification programme of the former (e.g. Brubaker, 1996; Tishkov, 1997; Opalski,
1998; Kolstø, 2000). Most of this literature has focused on language issues,
territorial autonomy and the representation of minorities in state institutions.
Academia has paid relatively little attention to the role of history education in the
construction of national identity despite its obvious relevance for nation building
politics. Through education in national history the state attempts to root national
identity in the past and nurture youngsters in a historical narrative that legitimizes
state independence and the cultural politics of the state. The few studies that have
focused on history education as a nationalizing agent (e.g. Hein & Selden, 2000;
Koulouri, 2001; Vickers, 2005) have generally not linked their findings to theories
and debates in the field of nationalism and ethnic conflicts. This study may be seen
as an interdisciplinary effort to tackle this omission. It expands on some of my
previous work in which I used textbook analysis to inform the ethnic-East/civic-West
debate in the field of nationalism (e.g. Janmaat, 2006).
An important aspect of history education is the treatment of ethnic others. As
Carras (2001) has noted, states with nationalizing programs usually portray ethnic
others in a negative light in their history textbooks. Harmful effects of contacts with
ethnic others are highlighted whereas positive results are downplayed or omitted
altogether. This negative stereotyping of ethnic others may be said to have four
functions for identity construction. First, it sets boundaries and distinguishes the in-
from the out-group. This boundary setting involves more than the simple ethnic
labelling of persons and groups. By assigning certain vices to the out-group and
certain virtues to the in-group, nation-builders can reinforce the uniqueness and
depth of the in-group’s identity and give its members the assured feeling of moral
superiority. Second, by stressing the hostility of the out-group, it sweeps conflicts
within the in-group under the carpet, which contributes to the latter’s cohesion.
Third, it provides a justification for a liberation struggle against a foreign ‘oppressor’
and for the establishment and consolidation of an independent state. Finally, it
acquits the governing elite of a newly independent state from bad management by
holding the former foreign regime responsible for the current problems in society
(i.e. the scapegoat mechanism).
It must be noted that the ethnic stereotyping in textbooks and in other media has
regularly been high on the agenda of (nongovernmental) international organizations
promoting peace, human rights and democracy, certainly during or shortly after
major international conflicts. Thus, as early as the 1920s the League of Nations
launched various initiatives to combat mutual xenophobia, proceeding from the
assumption that the national prejudice in textbooks must have contributed to the
aggressive nationalism and militarism of the warring parties in World War I. A
strikingly similar reaction occurred after World War II. In cooperation with the
Council of Europe and the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook
Research, UNESCO organized conferences, bilateral projects and the development
of guidelines for improving teaching materials and textbooks in an effort to foster
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international cooperation and understanding (Pingel, 1999). In similar vein, the
eruption of violent ethnic conflicts following the collapse of communism in Eastern
Europe sparked a series of activities of various organizations, including the Council
of Europe and Euroclio (the European Standing Conference of History Teachers
Associations), which in essence were all aimed at countering prejudice and
intolerance and stimulating civic values, critical thinking and democracy. Thus,
with each new round of violent conflict, international concern about the role of
history education in fostering inter-ethnic animosity is gathering momentum.
This paper examines representations of the ethnic other in Ukrainian history
textbooks. Ukraine is an interesting case to study as it is both a new state emerging
from the ashes of the Soviet Union and a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual state, which
means that the majority-minority problematic very much applies. Moreover, it is a
state for which it is extremely easy to find a suitable ethnic other for the identity
construction project: Russia and the Russians. From the partition of Poland at the
end of the eighteenth century, much of what is present-day Ukraine has been ruled
by Russia and its communist successor—the Soviet Union. This paper therefore
focuses on portrayals of Russia and the Russians. The more prejudiced the books are
towards this ethnic other, the more important the nationalizing agenda is considered
to be in relation to other objectives of history education. In this respect, it is worth
noting that the cultivation of national identity is an official—and therefore weighty—
policy objective, as numerous documents testify. For instance, the strategic national
programme ‘Education—Ukraine of the twenty-first century’, adopted in 1993 by a
nationalist government headed by Ukraine’s first president Leonid Kravchuk, calls
on education to espouse ‘a national orientation which proceeds from the
indivisibility of education from national foundations, the organic unity with national
history and folk traditions, and the preservation and enrichment of the culture of the
Ukrainian people’ (Government of Ukraine, 1994, p. 7).
The ethnic other in history textbooks: differences between East and West?
A factor that is likely to contribute to the negative stereotyping of the others in
textbooks is a national narrative of victimization. As Koulouri (2001) and
Kymlicka (2001) observed, there is a marked tendency among nations in the
Balkans and in Eastern Europe to see themselves as victims of centuries of foreign
oppression. Thus the Serbs and the Greeks hold grievances against the Turks, the
Czechs against the Austrians and the Germans, the Slovaks and the Romanians
against the Hungarians and the Poles, the Ukrainians and the Baltic nations against
the Russians. In multi-ethnic states where minorities constituted the former rulers
or were seen as collaborators with the foreign regime by the majority, inter-ethnic
relations have remained tense in the post-communist period. As a rule, the
majority distrusts the minority and suspects that it will opt for secession as soon as
an opportunity arises. In conditions of ethnic conflict negative images of the ethnic
other seem almost inescapable. Indeed, Koren (2001) observes that Croatian
history and geography textbooks tend to give unflattering accounts of Serbs and
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stress hostility and conflict rather than cooperation in their descriptions of
Croatian-Serb relations.
This discussion raises an interesting point: given the prevailing sense of historical
injustice in Eastern Europe, is historiography in that region fundamentally different
from that in Western Europe? Some scholars support this view. Hans Kohn (1944;
1994), for instance, saw nationalist historiography as a necessary companion of an
ethnic intolerant nationalism. This type of nationalism looked to the past as a source
of inspiration, perceiving the nation as a natural and eternal entity defined by common
historical experience, culture and descent. It prevailed, in Kohn’s view, in those
regions of Europe where feudal relations predominated, i.e. in Central and Eastern
Europe. He contrasted this with a civic liberal nationalism which ‘arose in an effort to
build a nation in the political reality and the struggles of the present without too much
sentimental regard for the past’ (Kohn, 1994, p. 164). He saw civic nationalism as
characteristic of societies with strong middle classes—America, Britain, France, The
Netherlands and Switzerland. Echoing Kohn, Velychenko (1993) argues that
‘the poorer, authoritarian societies east of the Elbe’ pay much more attention to the
identity construction function of historiography than the ‘wealthier, pluralist and
constitutional societies of Western Europe’ because the national identities of the
former rely to a much greater extent on historical myths and legends.
Kohn’s view has been criticised for failing to recognize that Western nations also
have ethnic and historical roots (Smith, 1986). It is not denied that there are
differences between nations in the strength of ethnic conceptions but these are seen
as a matter of degree and not of absolute difference (Smith, 1991). Kuzio (2002) has
suggested that the mix of ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood in any given
state has nothing to do with geography but is contingent on the age of that state and
on the consolidation of democracy. Moreover, returning to historiography, it has
been noted that historical writings in the West have not always been friendly on
ethnic others as well. Marsden (2000) for instance notes that the glorification of war
and the vilification of neighbouring states permeated the history and geography
textbooks of Great Britain, France, the USA and Germany from the 1880s to the
1940s, despite efforts of the League of Nations to curb rampant chauvinism in
textbooks in the interwar period. Berghahn and Schissler (1987) observe that it took
a world war and a sustained effort of UNESCO and the Council of Europe before
western states began removing nationalist leanings and ethnic stereotypes from their
educational materials. Thematically, history textbooks diversified, addressing socio-
economic and cultural issues and paying more attention to European and
international issues (for a description of this process in German and French history
and civics textbooks, see Soysal, Bertilotti and Mannitz, 2005). In terms of
pedagogical objectives, they exchanged the infusion of values, identities and pre-
digested, unquestioned knowledge for the promotion of critical thinking, causal
understanding and independent analysis (Berghahn & Schissler, 1987). Antoniou
and Soysal (2005) remark that Greece and Turkey, recently, have also turned their
backs on nationalistic content and stereotypical images of the other in the teaching of
national history.
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Is history going to repeat itself for Eastern Europe? Can we, in other words, expect
eastern states to start off with ethnocentric narratives in the immediate post-
communist era and gradually substitute them for more neutral accounts of the ethnic
other as their institutions and democracies mature and they grow more self-
confident? The assumption that Eastern Europe will simply copy the trends
witnessed in the West overlooks the fact that the world is not the same as 70 years
ago. Human rights, liberalism, democracy and recognition of cultural difference
have become influential worldwide discourses in the post-colonial era (Soysal &
Schissler, 2005). At the same time, developments in communication technology
have given ordinary citizens an unprecedented opportunity to familiarize themselves
with information and points of view not appreciated by the state. As a result, the
nation-building projects of new states have been challenged both from below, by
independent well-informed citizens and national minorities, and from above, by
international agencies that closely monitor these states’ cultural policies. Is it at all
possible in these conditions to pursue monolithic nationalizing projects that
denigrate the ethnic other? Or are we all deceived by the rhetoric of globalization,
and is a very thin layer of highly visible successful urbanites disguising the fact that
the rest of the population in the newly independent states still think in traditional
terms? Indeed there seems to be some evidence that long-established ethnocentric
views are much more resilient than international organizations are willing to admit
(who seem to have the image of citizens as well-informed, non-prejudiced, vocal and
rational decision makers). Anderson (2005), for instance, observes that a new history
course, introduced by the Moldovan government in 2003 and supported by the
Council of Europe, was met with suspicion and hostility by ethnic Romanian
teachers and parents, who perceived it as a shrewd attempt by their government to
re-Sovietize and de-nationalize them.
Methodological approach and textbook selection
In the light of all these observations, how are the Russians as Ukraine’s main ethnic
other presented in history textbooks? Is Ukraine, in Kohn’s terminology, behaving
like a typical ‘ethnic intolerant’ state by attributing only bad intentions to the
Russians? Do we see differences between generations of textbooks reflecting a
change towards more balanced accounts of the ethnic other?
I will explore these questions by analysing two generations of textbooks for the
History of Ukraine course, which the government instituted after independence. The
ethnic other can be conceived of as a foreign ruler (Russia and the Soviet Union) or
as a national group (the Russians). I will examine textbook representations of both
these manifestations. I have further identified three ‘positive’ periods and three
‘negative’ periods in history when Ukraine was ruled by a foreign power. The
positive periods are characterized by peace, rising standards of living and an
expansion of civic and cultural liberties. By contrast, war, famine, sharply declining
standards of living and/or increased oppression feature in the negative periods. I
identified the reign of Alexander II (1855–1881), the Soviet 1920s and
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Khrushchev’s Thaw (1956–1965) as the positive periods and the rule of Catherine II
(end of eighteenth century), the consolidation of Bolshevik power in Ukraine (1917–
1921) and the collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s as the negative periods.
To assess how the textbooks write about the ethnic other in these periods, I will
employ the following criteria:
1. Positive appraisals. Do the textbooks also offer positive judgements about the
foreign ruler’s policies, or about the actions of members of the other national
group? Are these judgements immediately followed by qualifications?
2. Intentions. Is the ethnic other described as motivated solely by malign intentions?
3. Ethnic labelling. Is there explicit ethnic labelling of perpetrators and victims? Are
Russians exclusively seen as perpetrators and Ukrainians only as victims?
4. Normative language. Are negative appraisals of the ethnic other reinforced by
strong normative language?
I selected the following textbooks for the analysis:
First generation:1
Kul’chyts’kyi, S. V., Kurnosov, Y. & Koval’, M. V. (1994) Istoria Ukrainy: Chastyna
I. (Kyiv, Osvita).
Sarbei, V. H. (1996) Istoria Ukrainy: XIX— Nachalo XX Veka (Kyiv, Heneza).
Serhienko, H. Y. & Smolyi, V. A. (1995) Istoria Ukrainy: S Drevneishikh Vremen do
Kontsa XVIII Veka (Kyiv, Osvita).
Turchenko, F. H. (1995) Noveishaia Istoria Ukrainy: Chast’ Pervaia (1917–1945
Gody) (Kyiv, Heneza).
Turchenko, F. H., Panchenko, P. P. & Tymchenko, C. M. (1995) Noveishaia Istoria
Ukrainy: Chast’ Vtoraia (1945–1995 Gody) (Kyiv, Heneza).
Second generation:
Kul’chyts’kyi, S. V. & Shapoval, Y. I. (2003) Novitnia Istoria Ukrainy (1914–1939).
(Kyiv, Heneza).
Shvyd’ko, H. K. (2003) Istoria Ukrainy: XVI–XVIII Stolittia (Kyiv, Heneza).
Turchenko, F. H. (2002) Novitnia Istoria Ukrainy: Chastyna Persha 1914–1939
(Kyiv, Heneza).
Turchenko, F. H. & Moroko, V. M. (2004) Istoria Ukrainy: Kinets’ XVIII—Pochatok
XX Stolittia (Kyiv, Heneza).
Turchenko, F. H., Panchenko, P. P. & Tymchenko, C. M. (2004) Novitnia Istoria
Ukrainy: Chastyna Druha 1939–2001 (Kyiv, Heneza).
There is good reason to assume that these textbooks were and are widely used as
they are all officially approved by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education.2 After
independence, the Ministry chose to continue the centralized Soviet approach to
history education by issuing detailed national curricula and by closely supervising
the textbook adoption, production and dissemination process.3 It also copied the
practice of carving history up into a world history and a national history course, thus
underlining the distinctiveness of Ukrainian nation- and statehood. Yet, from the
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onset the Ministry has been careful to involve other agencies in the textbook writing
and adoption procedure. In cooperation with the National Academy of Sciences, the
Academy of Pedagogical Sciences and private publishers and foundations, it
organizes annual competitions for new textbooks. The awarded textbooks are first
tried and tested in schools and—if necessary—revised before receiving the official
stamp of approval. Schools are obliged to use the officially approved textbooks but
are free to use any kind of additional materials. Moreover, the Ministry seeks to
diversify the offer of textbooks by providing schools with a choice of at least two
textbooks per grade (Krylach & Kul’chyts’kyi, 1999). Thus, the Ministry seems
committed to allowing some measure of pluralism in the teaching of national history
in schools.
Portrayals of the ethnic other in ‘negative’ periods
The elimination of the semi-autonomous Cossack state by Tsarina Catherine II in
1775 is an important negative event in Ukrainian historiography. It not only signals
the total subjugation to Russian Tsarist rule, but also the reinforcement of serfdom
and a retreat of the Ukrainian language from public affairs. Indeed, Serhienko and
Smolyi (1995) and Shwyd’ko (2003), the two textbooks examined for this period,
both present narratives resembling lamentations of injustices and oppression. The
actions of the Russian government are seen as being solely motivated by a lust for
power and a desire to extract profit from Ukraine’s thriving agricultural economy.
On occasion using strong normative language, the books recount how the plight of
the peasants and free Cossack farmers worsened under Catherine’s rule by the
imposition of taxes, the re-introduction of labour duties and regulations tying
peasants to the land. The implication of these extracts is clear: the attitude of the
Russian government toward the Ukrainian peasantry was one of complete
indifference at best and of open hostility at worst. Yet, although the peasantry is
presented as the cornerstone of Ukrainian nationhood, class relations are not
exclusively cast in ethnic terms with an ‘innocent’ Ukrainian peasantry being
exploited by ‘cruel’ Russian or Polish nobility. To the contrary, Shwyd’ko (2003)
contends that Catherina II restricted the freedom of movement of the peasantry on
request of some Ukrainian nobles. He also notes that the Ukrainian landed gentry
appealed to the tsarina to be given the same rights as the Russian nobility, seeing
their request fulfilled by the Decree on the Independence of the Nobility (Shwyd’ko,
2003, p. 266). It is interesting that Shwyd’ko identifies the nobility as Ukrainian
while its predecessor (Serhienko & Smolyi, 1995) is silent about the ethnicity of the
aristocracy. This could be a sign that the new generation of textbooks is less
apprehensive about challenging the myth that everything was peace and amity within
the ethnic Ukrainian community.
The second period that could be qualified as particularly traumatic in Ukrainian
history is the establishment of Bolshevik rule in the early 1920s. The books covering
this period (Turchenko, 1995, 2001; Kul’chyts’kyi & Shapoval, 2003) all
meticulously discuss how the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution became
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involved in a fierce struggle with the Central Rada, a Ukrainian parliament created in
March 1917, to win the hearts and minds of the Ukrainian population.
Unsurprisingly, these books present the latter as the only political body that
legitimately represented the Ukrainian nation and argue that the Bolsheviks were
essentially a foreign power that imposed its rule on Ukraine. Although the books
concede that the Bolsheviks had significant support among the urban proletariat and
the population in the Donbass, they claim that the vast majority of Ukrainians
remained loyal to the Central Rada. To underline this, they note that the rival
assembly in Kharkiv, established by the Bolsheviks in December 1917, attracted
delegates of no more than one-third of the Ukrainian local councils and that it
hosted very few representatives of the Ukrainian peasantry. Turchenko (1995, 2001)
points out that the Bolsheviks quickly resorted to other means to establish power
when they realized that the Ukrainians would not join them voluntarily. In strong
language, he accuses the Bolsheviks of eliminating democracy, persecuting
Ukrainian culture, terrorizing the population and pillaging cities and countryside,
and argues that these tactics only provoked more resistance: ‘The establishment of
Bolshevik power in Ukraine, by means of deceit, violence and direct interference
from abroad, inevitably had to become and became the object of nationwide
opposition’ (Turchenko 1995, p. 58; 2001, p. 97).
Kul’chits’kyi and Shapoval (2003), on the other hand, refrain from using
emotionally charged terminology and present a more cautious account of the
Bolshevik takeover. They note, for instance, that the popularity of the Bolsheviks
rose steeply after they exchanged their initial principles regarding the continuation of
the war and the collectivization of agriculture for slogans which called for an
immediate end to the war and an unconditional handover of land to the peasants.
But the authors also underline the undemocratic nature of Bolshevism and claim
that Lenin’s followers only adopted populist slogans to increase their chances of
organizing a successful coup d’etat. Moreover, the Bolsheviks are said to have
stooped to terror after their capture of Kyiv in February 1918, instigating a massacre
‘the Ukrainian capital had not seen since the raids of Khan Batia [following the
collapse of Kyivan Rus’ in the thirteenth century, JGJ]’ (Kul’chits’kyi & Shapoval,
2003, p. 69).
Despite their differences, neither Turchenko nor Kul’chits’kyi and Shapoval
engage in ethnic boundary making. The Bolsheviks are not presented as a uniquely
Russian movement as it is conceded that workers and the poorer sections of the
Ukrainian peasantry were allured by their message. Nonetheless, Turchenko (1995,
p. 180, 181; 2001, pp. 224, 225) underlines the foreign origin of the Bolsheviks by
stating that Ukrainians made up less than a quarter of the members of the
Communist Party of Ukraine in the early 1920s and that many top ranking officials
frowned upon the Ukrainian language, seeing it as a symbol of a backward, petty
bourgeois peasant culture.
Undoubtedly the third negative period examined here, the collectivization of
agriculture and its dramatic consequence, the 1932–33 Famine, is the most
traumatic episode in Ukrainian history. Understandably, the textbooks are highly
314 J. G. Janmaat
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critical of the role of the Soviet regime in these events, attributing sole
responsibility to Stalin’s government for the occurrence of the disaster (see also
Janmaat, 2006). Both Turchenko (1995, 2002) and Kul’chyts’kyi et al. (1994;
2003) note that Stalin’s principal reason for pursuing the collectivization of
agriculture was an easy extraction of and control over resources from the
countryside. They also agree that the famine was artificial, being caused by food
confiscation campaigns rather than natural events, and that it was a deliberate
instrument of the authorities to crush the opposition of the Ukrainian peasantry to
the collectivization drive.
Yet, as was the case in the narrative about the Bolsheviks, there are conspicuous
differences between the authors. Turchenko’s text is more radical in tone using
strong normative language to discredit Stalin’s regime. We read, for example, about
the ‘cruel crimes’ of Stalinism, about ‘cruel aggressors’, the ‘monstrous’ scale of the
Famine in Ukraine, victims of the ‘genocide’ of 1932–33 and about a totalitarian
regime ‘terrorizing’ the countryside (Turchenko, 1995, pp. 225–228). Kul’chyts’kyi
et al. (1994; 2003) are also highly critical of Stalin’s rule but use more neutral
terminology. A second difference concerns the identification of the victims. Whereas
Kul’chyts’kyi et al. (1994, p. 194) contend that the agricultural policies were
primarily targeting the peasantry—‘In reality however these activities were
consciously geared towards the slow physical annihilation of peasant families’—
Turchenko argues that the whole Ukrainian nation suffered from these policies.
Thus he opens his account of the Famine with the following statement: ‘One of the
most cruel crimes committed by Stalinism against the Ukrainian nation was the
Famine of 1932–1933’ (Turchenko, 1995, p. 225; 2002, p. 279). In the concluding
paragraph he writes:
The Tragedy of 1932–33 decisively crushed the resistance to the Kolchoz-feudal system
and essentially eliminated the forces that stood up for the vexed national rights.
Precisely this is what the totalitarian regime aimed for, what its representatives in
Ukraine cynically discussed. (Turchenko, 1995, p. 227; 2002, p. 282)
By hinting that the rest of the Ukrainian nation was as much attacked by the Soviet
authorities as the peasants resisting collectivization, this extract clearly reinforces the
nationalist image of the Soviet regime as a hostile, malicious force suppressing the
Ukrainians.
Given the severity of the disaster and the obvious involvement of the Soviet
regime, one would expect the Famine period to be the prime candidate for
nationalist myth-making of the type that sees ethnic others as the sole perpetrators
and the ethnic ‘us’ as the sole victims of the catastrophe. Yet, as in the account of the
Bolsheviks seizure of power, the textbooks refrain from ethnic stereotyping. Thus the
state and party officials involved in the collectivization and food confiscation
programmes are not pigeonholed as Russians or Jews. On the other hand, the
downside of not addressing ethnic differences is that ethnic Ukrainians are not
presented in an unfavourable light either. Thus the participation of many ethnic
Ukrainians in the grain-requisition bands pillaging the countryside (Wilson, 2002) is
an embarrassing detail not mentioned by any of the textbooks. Therefore the
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textbook narratives do leave the overall impression that ethnic Ukrainians were only
victims of and not collaborators in the food confiscation campaigns.
Portrayals of the ethnic other in ‘positive’ periods
Let us now turn to periods of foreign rule that are characterized by peace, economic
growth, rising standards of living and expanding liberties, in other words the ‘positive’
periods. The first of these episodes is the reign of Alexander II (1855–1881). In the
aftermath of the lost Crimean War this ‘enlightened’ tsar initiated major reforms,
including the abolition of serfdom, an overhaul of the justice system, a tempering of
censorship, autonomy for the universities, elected assemblies at the local and
provincial levels and universal military conscription. Following the Polish uprising in
the early 1860s, however, he also curtailed the cultural liberties of national minorities
and pursued a policy of Russification. How do the textbooks appreciate this mixed
legacy of expanding civic liberties, political reform and economic growth, on the one
hand, and repression of Ukrainian cultural activities on the other?
As it turns out, the textbooks (Sarbei, 1995; Turchenko & Moroko, 2004) do
appreciate the reforms but they immediately qualify them by saying that they were
largely ineffective or served other interests than those of the Ukrainians themselves.
Both books for instance acknowledge that the abolition of serfdom constituted a
major step forward, freeing serfs from their landlords, offering them freedom of
movement and allowing them to buy land and goods and engage in commercial
activities. Yet, both authors are quick to point out that the reform was designed from
above by the landowning nobility and therefore primarily served the interests of the
landowners. They also observe that the reform did not improve the living conditions
of the vast majority of peasants, crippled as these rural masses were by rents and
feudal labour duties that the reform had not eliminated.
More fundamentally, the reforms are judged as being solely inspired by a desire to
strengthen the Russian state and to catch up with western powers in socio-economic
development. The Russian government thus never truly intended to grant more
liberties to the population and to the non-Russian nationalities, it is argued.
Turchenko and Moroko (2004) for instance explain that the emancipation of the
serfs created the supply of labour necessary for the development of industry in
Ukraine. This industrialization, however, is described as one-sided, producing only
raw materials and semi-manufactured goods as input for Russian industries, and is
presented as the centre’s major tool of economic colonization and exploitation.
Understandably, both textbooks also deplore the tsarist decrees banning the use of
Ukrainian in schools and in the printed media, seeing them as prime examples of the
policy of domination and oppression by the Russian state. Turchenko and Moroko
(2004, p. 153) are particularly outspoken on the intentions of the Russian state
under Alexander II: ‘As before, Russian domestic politics rested on three
fundamental principles: unification, bureaucratization and Russification’.
As it turns out, bad intentions are not just attributed to the Russian state. Sarbei
(1995) for instance is overtly depreciatory of the Russians, Poles, Jews and other
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non-Ukrainians. Discussing the plight of the Ukrainians in the second half of the
nineteenth century he observes that ‘The majority of the landed nobility, and most of
all those of Russian or Polish descent, displayed a hostile attitude towards the
Ukrainian national idea. (…) The trade sector fell almost completely in the hands of
Russians, Jews, Armenians and Greeks, who often did not operate as civilized
merchants but as barbaric-predatory wholesale buyers and sellers’ (Sarbei, 1995,
pp. 105, 108). The succeeding textbook by Turchenko and Moroko (2004), by
contrast, refrains from depicting inter-ethnic relations in stereotypical terms.
Comparing the social position of Ukrainians to those of other nationalities, it
provides a neutral description of the economic activities and settlement patterns of
Russians and Jews and avoids negative qualifications. As with the narrative on the
elimination of the Cossack Hetmanate, this could be indicative of a trend in textbook
writing aiming to produce more de-nationalized historiographies.
I have identified the Soviet 1920s as the second positive period in Ukraine’s
history as this episode is generally appreciated as a time of relatively liberal
conditions in both socio-economic and cultural domains. Lenin’s pragmatic New
Economic Policy (NEP) left the countryside in peace, which enabled peasants to
freely manage the lands allocated to them by the Bolshevik land reforms. In the
cultural sphere, the Ukrainians benefited from the Bolshevik campaign to combat
illiteracy and invigorate the languages and cultures of the non-Russian nationalities
in the Soviet Union (the so-called Korenizatsia policy, which in Ukraine came to be
known as Ukrainizatsia).
It appears that the textbooks are ambivalent about this episode. They present a
cautious and qualified positive appraisal of the NEP. Turchenko (1995, 2002) and
Kyl’chyts’kyi and Shapoval (2003) for instance both note that the conditions for the
peasantry improved markedly after the authorities exchanged the rationing policy of
the civil war period for taxation in kind. They further observe that the land
redistribution scheme greatly benefited the poorest sections of the peasantry and that
agricultural output rose sharply and had caught up with pre-revolution levels by
1927. The textbooks are even unreservedly positive about the government campaign
to stimulate agricultural cooperatives, saying that the peasantry eagerly made use of
these incentives to found cooperatives for the processing and sale of their products.
Yet, it is argued that the Communist Party from the very onset had a much more
comprehensive kind of cooperative in mind, and never abandoned the idea of a
complete collectivization of agricultural land. Turchenko (1995, p. 189; 2002,
p. 236) contends that this constituted a major threat which hung like the ‘sword of
Damocles’ over the peasantry. More fundamentally, he deplores that the freedom in
the economic sphere was not matched by political rights, leaving the peasantry
powerless and exposed to the arbitrariness and ambitious industrialization plans of
the communist apparatchiks.
An equally hesitant account is given of the party-endorsed Ukrainianization
campaign in the 1920s. On the one hand, this language policy is appreciated, as it
‘attracted many representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to the process of
cultural rebuilding, who sincerely attempted to serve the nation and to contribute
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to its social-economic and spiritual revival’ (Turchenko 1995, p. 194; 2002,
p. 240). In a similar manner, the books value the achievements such as the
reduction of illiteracy, the mass admission of Ukrainians into the student
population and the expansion of Ukrainian-language education, publications and
official documents. On the other hand, they argue that Ukrainianization was not
strong enough to have a lasting impact on the language regime in the most
important sphere of public life, the Communist Party bureaucracy, where Russian
remained the dominant language. Turchenko notes that many party officials,
particularly Russian or Russian-speaking ones, were negatively disposed towards
Ukrainianization, ‘sabotaging it in all possible ways’ (Turchenko, 1995, p. 194;
2002, p. 241). Moreover, the books accuse the Bolshevik regime of seeing
Ukrainianization only as a tool to indoctrinate the population with the communist
ideology rather than as a goal in itself. Kul’chyts’kyi and Shapoval (2003, p. 200)
for instance note:
The cultural activities of the state were mainly directed at the education of the masses in
the spirit of communism. The party controlled the content of the national-cultural
process and demanded that cultural life was national in form and socialist in content, so
that it did not contradict the communist doctrine.
In sum, the books argue that the economic and cultural liberties of the 1920s were
always subordinate to industrialization and the consolidation of the state and the
party. As soon as the former began to be seen as conflicting with these objectives,
they were abandoned.
The third ‘positive’ period of foreign rule investigated here is Khrushchev’s Thaw
(1956–1965). This period is widely recognized as a welcome and promising change
to the suffocating totalitarianism of the Stalinist era. It stands out for its increased
openness, economic decentralization, diversification of industry, rising standards of
living, flowering of national cultures and rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinist
persecution. The man who set this in motion, Nikita Khrushchev, is generally
depicted as a rather rude and unsophisticated man with nonetheless good intentions.
An authoritative source like the Encyclopaedia Britannica (EB) for instance describes
him as ‘a patriot who genuinely wanted to improve the lot of all Soviet citizens’ (EB,
1994, p. 994). The EB also notes that Khrushchev was a Russian who had grown up
in Ukraine and that this facilitated the careers of many Ukrainians in Moscow.
Khrushchev’s ‘Thaw’ however is also remembered for the continuation of
Russification, failed agricultural experiments and rash diplomacy.
The textbook narratives of the Khrushchev era are very much in line with those of
the other two ‘positive’ periods of foreign rule in Ukrainian history. On the one hand
there is genuine appreciation for the reforms. Turchenko et al. (1995, 2004) for
instance note that the economic decentralization was conducive for the moderniza-
tion of industry and the development of light industries, and that standards of living
and the construction of new homes rose sharply in the second half of the 1950s.
Similarly, they value the relative freedom of expression which is said to have enabled
a resurrection of Ukrainian literature and arts. On the other hand, it is argued that
the Soviet authorities were not recognizing the intrinsic value of the reforms,
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perceiving them instead as instruments for the attainment of other objectives. As
Turchenko et al. (1995, p. 56; 2004, p.124) phrase it:
The party leadership realized that without a certain measure of democratization it
would not be possible to modernize the country, accelerate its economic development
and maintain its status as a military superpower.
Moreover, Turchenko et al. are never tired of reminding the reader that the freedom
of expression was still very much restricted and that people who dared to cross the
line were relentlessly persecuted. Moreover, they deplore Khrushchev’s conviction
that all Soviet nationalities would spontaneously assimilate into a Russian-speaking
Soviet nation (sblizhenia i sliania natsii), claiming that it ushered in a renewed
Russification campaign that further weakened the position of Ukrainian in
education, the media and other public domains.
As in the narratives of the other periods, the textbooks refrain from highlighting
the ethnic background of the people and characters discussed. This has the distinct
advantage that ethnic others are not judged negatively. Yet, it also excludes positive
appraisals. It could be argued that the Kruschchev era—par excellence—has all the
ingredients for more positive evaluations of ethnic others given Krushchev’s own
origin as a Russian Ukrainian, the careers of Ukrainians in central institutions and
the socio-economic progress in Ukraine itself. The fact that the textbooks fail to
portray Russians or other Soviet nationalities in a more favourable light could reflect
the allergy Ukrainian historians have to the Soviet slogan of ‘the brotherhood of all
Soviet nationalities’, but it could also be indicative of a nationalist motivated
unwillingness to acknowledge the positive contributions ethnic others made to
Ukraine’s development.
Discussion
This article has examined how Ukrainian history textbooks portray the ethnic other,
both as foreign ruler and as non-native national group. The most conspicuous
feature of the textbooks is the unanimous condemnation of the foreign ruler—Russia
in the years prior to the October Revolution and the Soviet Union in the years
thereafter. The tsarist authorities and the Soviet regime are attributed malicious
intentions, irrespective of their policies and the consequences for Ukraine. Never are
the rulers in St Petersburg or Moscow perceived as being genuinely committed to
the improvement of the living conditions and civic rights of Ukrainians. They are
always shown as being motivated by a determination to strengthen their hold on
power and to consolidate the state vis-a`-vis other powerful states in the international
arena. The textbooks do not deny that there have been periods of relatively liberal
rule when Ukraine benefited from economic and cultural reforms initiated by the
centre, but they contend that the Russian and Soviet authorities had an instrumental
attitude towards these reforms, never seeing prosperity and democratization as ends
in themselves. As soon as liberal reforms were seen as conflicting with the
consolidation of power and the unity of the state, the centre would abandon them,
the books argue. It needs to be reminded that Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union
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were, of course, not democratic regimes, which lends some credence to the
argument that they were mostly driven by power considerations. Yet, it would seem
too harsh a judgement to assign only bad intentions to these foreign rulers,
particularly in the face of evidence from other sources which credit some Soviet
leaders with positive moral qualities. The exceptionally critical accounts of foreign
rulers are therefore likely to reflect a desire to find a solid justification for Ukrainian
statehood and to foster strong feelings of patriotism among youngsters. They send
the political message that prosperity and freedom for the Ukrainian people can only
be guaranteed by an independent Ukrainian state (Shapoval, 1999). In this sense the
textbook narratives on foreign regimes have a distinct nationalist bias.
The same cannot be said about appraisals of the ethnic other as a national group.
The majority of the textbooks analysed in this study refrained from putting ethnic
labels on individuals or groups. The few instances where this does happen and where
negative judgements fall onto Russians and Jews are counterbalanced by excerpts
criticizing ethnic Ukrainians or highlighting conflicting interests within the
Ukrainian ethnic group. Only the failure of the books to present Russians, Jews or
other non-Ukrainian groups in a positive light may be seen as an omission
constituting a small ethnic bias. Nonetheless, the absence of any positive evaluations
of ethnic others in combination with the harsh judgement on Tsarist Russia and the
Soviet Union may well produce or maintain strong feelings of alienation among
Russians and other minorities. These groups could well interpret the textbook
rhetoric as a verdict condemning them for their ‘collaboration’ with the foreign
regime in the ‘suppression’ of Ukrainians, and as a message telling them they are not
welcome in Ukraine.
There is no reason, however, to end this paper with gloomy conjectures. The
analysis has also shown that the newest generation of textbooks present more
balanced accounts of inter-ethnic relations than the first series of textbooks.
Moreover, although the rule of former president Kuchma will not be remembered
for its commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, Ukraine’s
educational authorities have increasingly sought to involve international agencies in
the preparation of educational reforms in this period. From 1996, for instance, the
Ministry of Education and the Council of Europe (COE) have jointly organized a
series of seminars and conferences in Ukraine on reforming the teaching of history
and on the COE’s Education for Democratic Citizenship program. Remarkably, the
participants of these seminars (civic servants, teachers and textbook writers) were
not afraid to be highly critical of the state of history education in Ukraine, urging
textbook authors to write books that present multi-perspective views including those
of minorities and encourage student creativity and critical thinking. One civic
servant, for instance, denounced the current textbooks for ascribing intentions to
historical leaders that they could not have possessed (Council of Europe, 1999;
2000). The policy recommendations resulting from these conferences did not fall on
deaf ears as the Ministry of Education incorporated them in the central requirements
(the so-called State Standards) for the curriculum of the new 12-year school system.
The new standard for the theme ‘Knowledge of Society’ (suspil’stvoznavstvo), which
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includes History of Ukraine, for instance, mentions the cultivation of tolerance and
respect for other nations, critical thinking, responsibility, independent judgement
and the ability to make a conscious choice as key objectives of the new curriculum
(Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2004, p. 3).
It is by no means certain, however, that the scholars on whom the Ministry
depends for the writing of curricula and textbooks are equally supportive of a major
reform of history education. Typically these scholars belong to the Ukrainian
intelligentsia and consider it their lifework to expose the Tsarist and Soviet ‘crimes’
against the Ukrainian nation.4 Obviously, the single anti-Soviet narrative they have
in mind conflicts with efforts to promote a multiplicity of perspectives. There are
already signs that the language of reform of the state standards is not filtering down
in curricula and textbooks. For instance, the new history curriculum for the fifth
grade as before presents a strictly chronological narrative of Ukrainian history and
specifies in detail the content, the volume and the timing of the subject matter.5
Plans to institute an integrated history course combining world and national history
are viewed with equal suspicion by these scholars as they are seen as covert measures
to reduce the number of hours and thus to economize on history education
(Kul’chyts’kyi, 2000).
Yet, it is not only the civil servants at the Ministry who are pressing for changes.
There are movements at the grassroots level which suggest that there is broad
support for reform. A survey among history and civics teachers conducted in
September-October 2001 for instance found that making myths of past events and
outdated approaches to the selection of facts and their interpretation were
mentioned as key problems in the current history courses (Verbytska, 2004).
Moreover, the all-Ukrainian Association of History Teachers Nova Doba has taken
the initiative to develop an auxiliary textbook on Ukrainian history for the tenth
grade in cooperation with the international umbrella organization of history teachers
Euroclio and several foreign experts. This book (Komarov et al., 2004) closely
resembles western textbooks in approach and teaching methods.
All these developments indicate that history education has become the object of a
heated public debate in which interests clash and nation-building increasingly has to
compete with other pedagogical objectives. This, it might be argued, is only one of
the many indicators that democracy is growing to maturity in Ukraine, a process so
vividly illustrated by the peaceful civic revolution in December 2004 and the orderly
parliamentary elections of March 2006. Under these conditions, it seems only a
matter of time before the lively public debate penetrates the schools and influences
the history lessons. If this happens, history will indeed repeat itself, and the
aforementioned evolutionary model by Kuzio will have rightly predicted the
developments in history education.
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Notes
1. Except for Kul’chyts’kyi et al. the titles of the first generation textbooks are given in a
transcription from Russian. This is because I read the Russian translations.
2. For a list of approved textbooks, see Osvita Ukrainy, 2004, no. 60–61, p. 15.
3. For the first national curriculum of the History of Ukraine course, see Ministry of Education
(1996).
4. For an example of this attitude, see the open letter of February 2005 which criticises a
campaign led by communist deputies to rehabilitate the Soviet regime, particularly regarding
its role in World War II. This letter, which was addressed to the president and parliament, was
signed by a number of well-known historians (Hurzhi, 2005).
5. For the new curriculum, see Navchal’na Programa dlia Zahal’noosvitnikh Navchal’nykh
Zakladiv (12 Richna Shkola), Istoria Ukraina, 5 Klas (2005) (teaching programme for 12 year
comprehensive schools, 5th class).
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